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Abstract— In this paper, we consider privacy against hy-
pothesis testing adversaries within a non-stochastic framework.
We develop a theory of non-stochastic hypothesis testing by
borrowing the notion of uncertain variables from non-stochastic
information theory. We define tests as binary-valued mappings
on uncertain variables and prove a fundamental bound on the
best performance of tests in non-stochastic hypothesis testing.
We use this bound to develop a measure of privacy. We then
construct reporting policies with prescribed privacy and utility
guarantees. The utility of a reporting policy is measured by the
distance between the reported and original values. We illustrate
the effects of using such privacy-preserving reporting polices
on a publicly-available practical dataset of preferences and
demographics of young individuals, aged between 15-30, with
Slovakian nationality.
I. INTRODUCTION
For decades, stochastic policies have been used for privacy
protection [1]. More recently, stochastic policies with prov-
able privacy guarantees have been developed within differ-
ential privacy [2]–[5] and information-theoretic privacy [6]–
[12]. Differential privacy uses randomization to ensure that
the statistics of the reported outputs do not change noticeably
by variations in an individual entry of the dataset. This
can be ensured by the use of additive Laplace or Gaussian
noise with a scale proportional to the sensitivity of the
reports on a private dataset with respect to the individual
entries of the dataset. Information-theoretic privacy, dating
back to the secrecy problem [13], emphasizes on masking
or equivocating of information from the intended primary
receiver or a secondary receiver with as much information as
the primary receiver (e.g., an eavesdropper) [12], [14]–[16]
while providing guarantees on utility by bounding distortion,
i.e., the distance between obfuscated and original reports.
Although the above-mentioned stochastic policies provide
provable privacy guarantees, many organizations still use de-
terministic heuristic-based privacy-preserving methods, such
as k-anonymity [17], [18] and `-diversity [19]. For instance,
anonymization is frequently used by governments1 or compa-
nies alike for releasing private data2 to the broader public for
analysis even though it is proved to be insufficient for privacy
preservation [20]–[22]. Other policies, such as k-anonymity,
are also vulnerable to attacks [19].
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1See https://data.gov.au for an example of government initia-
tive.
2See https://www.kaggle.com for examples of data from private
companies and individuals.
The popularity of non-stochastic/deterministic privacy-
preserving policies is perhaps caused by factors, such as
undesirable properties of differentially-private additive noise
especially the Laplace noise [23], [24], simplicity of im-
plementing deterministic policies (in the sense of not re-
quiring expertise in probability theory) [25], and generation
of unreasonable/unrealistic outputs by the use of random-
ness [26]–[28]. The guarantees of information-theoretic pri-
vacy policies are also presented in the form of averages, i.e.,
they only bound the average amount of leaked information.
Information-theoretic policies also require the knowledge of
probability distributions of datasets, which might not be
available at the time of design or might change across time.
This motivates the need for better understanding of non-
stochastic privacy policies.
The lack of systematic methods for developing or assess-
ing deterministic privacy-preserving policies is due to the
lack of privacy measures for deterministic policies on de-
terministic datasets. This makes proving privacy guarantees
for deterministic policies, in any sense, even if weak or
limited in scope or practice, impossible. Recently, the theory
of non-stochastic information theory [29]–[36] was used to
develop a deterministic measure of privacy [37]. The measure
was successfully utilized to show that binning, a popular
deterministic policy for privacy preservation, provides some
guarantees, and to prove that k-anonymity is in fact not
privacy preserving, without resorting to extensive simula-
tions and numerical studies (which are only sufficient and
not necessary in analysis of general policies). The privacy
measure in [37] is perfect for providing protections against
generic adversaries; however, in some instances more might
be known about the privacy-intrusive adversaries, hence the
privacy measure can be further refined.
A category of adversaries studied in privacy literature is
the category of hypothesis testing adversaries [4], [10], [38].
The adversary, here, is interested in examining the validity of
a hypothesis, e.g., if a house is occupied or if an individual
has a certain disease based on some reports. The privacy
risk, in this case, is often measured by the minimum error
probability of the adversary. In this paper, we expand this
analysis to a non-stochastic framework. To do so, we develop
a theory of non-stochastic hypothesis testing by borrowing
the concept of uncertain variables from non-stochastic infor-
mation theory. Uncertain variables only consider support sets
and do not assign distributions/measures to variables. In non-
stochastic hypothesis theory, we define tests as binary-valued
functions on uncertain variables. We prove a fundamental
bound for the best performance of tests. This bound is
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used to develop a measure of privacy. We then construct
reporting functions with given privacy and utility guarantees.
We illustrate the outcomes of using such privacy-preserving
polices on a practical dataset.
The rest of the paper organized as follows. We present the
non-stochastic hypothesis testing framework in Section II.
In Section III, we investigate privacy against hypothesis-
testing adversaries. Finally, we present numerical results in
Section IV and conclude the paper in Section V.
II. NON-STOCHASTIC HYPOTHESIS TESTING
In this section, we develop a framework for non-stochastic
hypothesis testing starting by introducing the notion of
uncertain variables.
A. Uncertain Variables
Consider Ω whose elements ω ∈ Ω are samples. These
elements the source of uncertainty. An uncertain variable is
a mapping defined over Ω, such as X : Ω → X with X(ω)
denoting a realization of the uncertain variable. When the
dependence of the uncertain variable, u.v., to the sample is
evident from the context, X(ω) is replaced by X . In this
paper, we restrict ourselves to real-valued uncertain variables,
e.g., X ⊆ Rnx for some integer nx ≥ 0. Marginal range of
any uncertain variable X is JXK := {X(ω) : ω ∈ Ω} ⊆ X,
joint range of two uncertain variables X : Ω → X and
Y : Ω→ Y is JX,Y K := {(X(ω), Y (ω)) : ω ∈ Ω} ⊆ X×Y,
and conditional range of X , conditioned on realization of
uncertain variable Y (ω) = y, is JX|yK := {X(ω) : ∃ω ∈
Ω such that Y (ω) = y} ⊆ JXK. Uncertain variables (Xi)ni=1
are unrelated if JX1, . . . , XnK = JX1K×· · ·×JXnK. Further,
they are conditionally unrelated, conditioned on uncertain
variable Y , if JX1, . . . , Xn|yK = JX1|yK× · · · × JXn|yK for
all y ∈ JY K. For two uncertain variables, X1 and X2 are
unrelated if JX1|x2K = JX1K,∀x2 ∈ JX2K.
An uncertain variable X for which JXK is uncountably
infinite is a continuous uncertain variable, similar to a
continuous random variable. An uncertain variable X for
which JXK is finite is a discrete uncertain variable. Non-
stochastic entropy of a continuous uncertain variable X can
be defined as
h0(X) := log(µ(JXK)) ∈ R ∪ {±∞}, (1)
where µ is the Lebesgue measure. The logarithm can be
taken in any basis; the logarithm is in the natural basis in
this paper in line with the literature on differential entropy
of continuous random variables. The non-stochastic entropy
in (1) is sometimes referred to as Re´nyi differential 0-
entropy [32]. Non-stochastic entropy of a discrete uncertain
variable X can be defined as
H0(X) := log(|JXK|) ∈ R, (2)
where | · | is the cardinality of a set. In this paper, for discrete
uncertain variables, in line with the literature on entropy of
discrete random variables, the logarithm is in the basis of
two.
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Fig. 1. Relationship between uncertain variables in non-stochastic
hypothesis testing based on uncertain measurements.
B. Hypothesis Testing Based on Uncertain Measurements
Consider three uncertain variables in Figure 1. Uncer-
tain variable X denotes an original uncertain variable. We
have access to an uncertain measurement of this variable
denoted by Y . This is captured by that Y = gY (X) for
a mapping gY : JXK → JY K. Using the definition of
unrelated variables, the relationship can be expressed by that,
for any uncertain variable Z, Y and Z are conditionally
unrelated, conditioned on uncertain variable X . Recalling
that uncertain variables are mappings from the sample space,
it must be that Y = gY ◦ X . Similarly, we may define
the hypothesis as an uncertain variable H with binary rangeJHK = {p0, p1}, where p0 denotes the null hypothesis and
p1 denotes the alternative hypothesis. We assume that there
exists a mapping gH : JXK → JHK such that H = gH ◦X;
the hypothesis is constructed based on the uncertain variable
X as H = gH(X).
A test is a function T : JY K → JHK = {p0, p1}. If
T (Y ) = p1, the test rejects the null hypothesis in favour
of the alternative hypothesis; however, if T (Y ) = p0, the
test accepts the null hypothesis. The set of all tests is given
by JHKJY K, which captures the set of all functions from JY K
to JHK.
Consider y ∈ JY K such that T (y) = p0; the null hypothesis
is accepted. The realization of output Y (ω) = y may
correspond to many realizations of uncertain variable X , i.e.,
all the elements of the set JX|yK. We say that T (y) = p0
is correct, or the test is correct for the output realization
Y (ω) = y, if gH(x) = p0 for all x ∈ JX|yK, i.e., all
realizations of uncertain variable X compatible with y that
are also compatible with the null hypothesis. The same also
holds for the alternative hypothesis. In following definition,
we use the notation that JH|JX|yKK := {h ∈ JH|xK : x ∈JX|yK} = ∪x∈JX|yKJH|xK.
Definition 1 (Correctness): A test T ∈ JHKJY K is correct
at y ∈ JY K if JH|JX|yKK = {T (y)}. The set of all outputs for
which the test is correct is ℵ(T ) := {y ∈ JY K : JH|JX|yKK =
{T (y)}}. C
Based on this definition of correctness, we can define a
performance measure for a test:
P(T ) :=
{
log(µ(ℵ)), Y is a continuous u.v.
log(|ℵ|), Y is a discrete u.v. (3)
We seek an optimal hypothesis test using the optimization
problem in
T ∗ ∈ arg max
T∈JHKJY K P(T ). (4)
Definition 2 (Consistency): A test T : JY K → JHK is
consistent if (i) T (Y ) = p0 only if Y ∈ JY |p0K and (ii)
T (Y ) = p1 only if Y ∈ JY |p1K. C
In the following theorem, we prove that consistent tests are
in fact optimal in the sense of P . For any mapping g : x 7→ y,
we define the inverse image g−1(y) := {x : g(x) = y}.
Theorem 1: (Optimal Tests): Any consistent test is a so-
lution of (4). C
Proof: First, we proved three important claims.
Claim 1: JH|JX|yKK = {p0, p1} for any y ∈ JY |p1K ∩JY |p0K.
The proof for this claim is as follows. For any y ∈ JY |piK,
there exists x ∈ g−1Y (y) = JX|yK such that gH(x) = pi.
Therefore, {pi} ⊆ gH(JX|yK) = JH|JX|yKK. This implies
that, for any y ∈ JY |p1K∩ JY |p0K, {p0, p1} ⊆ JH|JX|yKK ⊆JHK = {p0, p1}.
Claim 2: JH|JX|yKK = {p0} for any y ∈ JY |p0K\ JY |p1K.
The proof for this claim is as follows. If y /∈ JY |p1K, there
must not exist x ∈ JX|yK such that gH(x) = p1. Therefore,
p1 /∈ JH|JX|yKK. Therefore, for any y ∈ JY |p0K \ JY |p0K, it
must be that p0 ∈ JH|JX|yKK and p1 /∈ JH|JX|yKK. This is
only possible if JH|JX|yKK = {p0}.
Claim 3: JH|JX|yKK = {p1} for any y ∈ JY |p1K\ JY |p0K.
The proof for this claim is the same as Claim 2.
With these claims in hand, we are ready to prove the
lemma. Note that
ℵ ={y ∈ JY K : JH|JX|yKK = {T (y)}}
={y ∈ JY |p0K \ JY |p1K : JH|JX|yKK = {T (y)}}
∪ {y ∈ JY |p0K ∩ JY |p1K : JH|JX|yKK = {T (y)}}
∪ {y ∈ JY |p1K \ JY |p0K : JH|JX|yKK = {T (y)}}
={y ∈ JY |p0K \ JY |p1K : JH|JX|yKK = {T (y)}}
∪ {y ∈ JY |p1K \ JY |p0K : JH|JX|yKK = {T (y)}},
where the last equality follows from that, by Claim 1,JH|JX|yKK = {p0, p1} while {T (y)} can be either {p0} or
{p1}. This shows that
ℵ ⊆ (JY |p0K \ JY |p1K) ∪ (JY |p1K \ JY |p0K),
and as a result
P(T ) ≤
{
log(µ(JY |p0K∆JY |p1K)), Y is a continuous u.v.,
log(|JY |p0K∆JY |p1K|), Y is a discrete u.v.,
where ∆ denotes the symmetric difference operator on the
sets. By the definition of consistent tests, we can see that
ℵ ={y ∈ JY |p0K \ JY |p1K : JH|JX|yKK = {p0}}
∪ {y ∈ JY |p1K \ JY |p0K : JH|JX|yKK = {p1}},
Finally,
ℵ = (JY |p0K \ JY |p1K) ∪ (JY |p1K \ JY |p0K),
because of Claims 2–3. This shows that consistent tests attain
the upper bound on the performance.
Note that if the realization of the lossy/uncertain measure-
ment Y belongs to JY |p0K∩JY |p1K, there is not enough evi-
dence to accept or reject the null hypothesis or the alternative
hypothesis. However, if the realization of the measurement
Y belongs to (JY |p0K \ JY |p1K) ∪ (JY |p1K \ JY |h2K) =JY |p0K∆JY |p1K, with ∆ denoting the symmetric difference
operator on the sets, we can confidently reject or accept the
null hypothesis or the alternative hypothesis. This fact is used
by the consistent tests to achieve the highest performance.
Theorem 2: (Performance Bound): The performance of
any test T ∈ JHKJY K is upper bounded as
P(T ) ≤
{
log(µ(JY |p0K∆JY |p1K)), Y is a continuous u.v.
log(|JY |p0K∆JY |p1K|), Y is a discrete u.v.
C
Proof: The upper bound in the statement of the theorem
follows from the proof of Theorem 1.
Theorem 2 can be seen as a non-stochastic equivalent of
Chernoff-Stein Lemma (see, e.g., [39, Ch. 11] for random-
ized hypothesis testing). Note that log(µ(JX|p0K∆JX|p1K))
essentially captures the difference between the ranges JX|p0K
and JX|p1K resembling the Kullback–Leibler divergence in
a non-stochastic framework. A same interpretation can also
be provided for log(|JX|p0K∆JX|p1K|).
Example 1: (Hypothesis testing using noisy measure-
ments): Consider an uncertain variable X = (X1, X2) ∈
[100, 250] × [−10, 10], where X1 denotes the height of an
individual in centimetres and X2 denotes a measurement
error in centimetres. Let the uncertain measurement to be
Y = gY (X) = X1 + X2. Further, the hypothesis uncertain
variable is defined as H = gH(X) = p01X1≤150 +
p11X1>150. The null hypothesis p0 is that the individual’s
is short (shorter than or equal to 150 centimetres) and the
alternative hypothesis is that the individual is tall (taller than
150 centimetres). Now, note that
JY |p0K = {X1 +X2 : 100 ≤ X1 ≤ 150, X2 ∈ [−10, 10]}
= [90, 160],JY |p1K = {X1 +X2 : 150 ≤ X1 ≤ 250, X2 ∈ [−10, 10]}
= [140, 260].
Thus JY |p0K ∩ JY |p1K = [140, 160]. Let T be a test such
that T (Y ) = p0 if Y ∈ [90, 150] and T (Y ) = p1 if Y ∈
(150, 260]. Evidently, T is a consistent test. We get
P(T ) = log(µ(JY |p0K∆JY |p1K))
= log(µ([90, 140) ∪ (160, 260]))
= log(150).
Further, note that h0(Y ) = log(170), if we scale the
performance by h0(Y ), we get
P(T )− h0(Y ) = log(150)− log(170) ≈ −0.1251.
Now imagine the case where X = (X1, X2) ∈ [100, 250]×
[−20, 20] with the interpretation that the amount of the
additive uncertain measurement noise is twice larger. In this
case, we have
P(T )− h0(Y ) = log(150)− log(190) ≈ −0.2364.
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Fig. 2. Communication structure between a sender and a hypothesis-testing
adversary.
This shows that, by increasing the amount of the noise, the
confidence of the test is reduced, which is in line with our
expectation. C
III. NON-STOCHASTIC PRIVACY AGAINST
HYPOTHESIS-TESTING ADVERSARY
Consider the communication diagram in Figure 2 between
a sender and an adversary. The adversary’s ultimate aim is to
accurately test a hypothesis H based on the communicated
information from the sender Y . The sender wants to provide
a message Y that is as close as possible to X while making
the adversary’s task in testing the validity of hypothesis H
hard. The policy of the sender is captured by the mapping
from X to Y , denoted by gY . We use the performance of
the adversary in testing the private hypothesis based on the
reported output Y to define a measure of privacy as
Priv(gY ) :=

h0(Y )− log(µ(JY |p0K∆JY |p1K)),
Y is a continuous u.v.
h0(Y )− log(|JY |p0K∆JY |p1K)),
Y is a discrete u.v.
(5)
Note that increasing Priv(gY ) implies that the size ofJY |p0K∆JY |p1K is decreased, thus degrading the perfor-
mance of any test employed by the adversary in light of
Theorem 2.
Definition 3 (-privacy): Policy gY is -private for some
 ∈ (0, 1] if Priv(gY ) ≥ log(). C
We need to balance privacy with utility, otherwise the best
policy is to report nothing. Therefore, we need to define a
measure of accuracy to balance against the privacy.
Definition 4 (ρ-accuracy): Policy gY is ρ-accurate for
some ρ ∈ (0,+∞) if supX∈JXK ‖X − gY (X)‖ ≤ 1/ρ. C
Increasing ρ in ρ-accuracy implies that supX∈JXK ‖X −
Y ‖ is decreased, thus improving the quality of the reported
output Y by enforcing it to stay consistently closer to X .
Theorem 3: Assume that JXK ⊆ Rnx , and g : Rnx−1 →
R exists such that
gH(x) =
{
p0, xi − g(x−i) ≥ 0,
p1, xi − g(x−i) < 0,
where x−i = (xj)j 6=i. Let
gY (x) =
(g(x−i), x−i), g(x−i)−
1
ρ
≤ xi ≤ g(x−i) + 1
ρ
,
x, otherwise,
and
 =
µ
(JXK ∩{x : g(x−i)− 1
ρ
≤ xi ≤ g(x−i) + 1
ρ
})
exp(h0(X))
.
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Y T (X)H,X
Fig. 2. Communication structure between a sender and a hypothesis-testing
adversary.
This shows that, by increasing the amount of the noise, the
confidence of the test is reduced, which is in line with our
expectation. ▹
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information from the sender Y . The sender wants to provide
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the adversary’s task in testing the validity of hypothesis H
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Theorem 2.
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R exists such that
gH(x) =
{
p0, xi − g(x−i) ≥ 0,
p1, xi − g(x−i) < 0,
where x−i = (xj)j≠i. Let
gY (x) =
⎧⎨⎩(g(x−i), x−i), g(x−i)−
1
ρ
≤ xi g(x−i) 1
ρ
,
x, otherwise,
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µ
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ρ
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ρ
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exp(h0(X))
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Fig. 3. Privacy guarantee, ϵ, versus accuracy level, ρ. The dashed line
shows the asymptotic O(ρ−1).
Then, gY is ρ-accurate and ϵ-private. ▹
Proof: The proof for ρ-accuracy, with ρ ∈ (0,+∞),
follows from that ∥X − gY (X)∥ = |xi − g(x−i)| ≤
1/ρ. The proof for ϵ-privacy follows from that, if JY K,
(JY |p0K∆JY |p1K), (JY |p0K∩ JY |p1K) are Lebesgue measur-
able, we get µ(JY K) = µ((JY |p0K∆JY |p1K) ∪ (JY |p0K ∩JY |p1K)) = µ(JY |p0K∆JY |p1K) + µ(JY |p0K ∩ JY |p1K) be-
cause (JY |p0K∆JY |p1K) ∪ (JY |p0K ∩ JY |p1K) = JY |p0K ∪JY |p1K = JY K.
For large enough ρ, it can be seen that JXK∩{x : g(x−i)−
ρ−1 ≤ xi ≤ g(x−i) + ρ−1} ≈ {x : g(x−i) − ρ−1 ≤ xi ≤
g(x−i) + ρ−1}, and, as a result, ϵ = O(ρ−1). This implies
that, for the policy in Theorem 3, we have
“privacy× accuracy = constant”.
With the theoretical results in hand, we can demonstrate the
effects of using the policy in Theorem 3 on a practical dataset
in the next section.
IV. NUMERICAL RESULTS
In this subsection, we consider design of a privacy-
preserving policy for reporting individuals height in cen-
timetres and weight in kilograms publicly. We consider an
adversary who is interested in identifying individuals passing
the obesity threshold in terms of body mass index (BMI),
e.g., an insurance agency may use publicly available data to
increase premiums of obese people or deny them insurance.
Therefore, there is a duty of care for releasing demographic
data of individuals publicly. By the definition of the U.S.
Department of Health & Human Services, a person, be it
female or male, is considered obese if their BMI is greater
than or equal to 30.
Let uncertain variable X denote the weight and height,
i.e., X = [X1 X2]⊤ with X1 ∈ [0, 200] denoting the
weight in kilograms and X2 ∈ [0, 250] denoting the height
Fig. 3. Privacy guarantee, , versus accuracy level, ρ. The dashed line
shows the asymptotic O(ρ−1).
Then, gY is ρ-accurate and -private. C
Proof: The proof for ρ-accuracy, with ρ ∈ (0,+∞),
follows from that ‖X − gY (X)‖ = |xi − g(x−i)| ≤
1/ρ. The proof for -privacy follows from that, if JY K,
(JY |p0K∆JY |p1K), (JY |p0K∩ JY |p1K) are Lebesgue measur-
able, we get µ(JY K) = µ((JY |p0K∆JY |p1K) ∪ (JY |p0K ∩JY |p1K)) = µ(JY |p0K∆JY |p1K) + µ(JY |p0K ∩ JY |p1K) be-
cause (JY |p0K∆JY |p1K) ∪ (JY |p0K ∩ JY |p1K) = JY |p0K ∪JY |p1K = JY K.
For large enough ρ, it can be seen that JXK∩{x : g(x−i)−
ρ−1 ≤ xi ≤ g(x−i) + ρ−1} ≈ {x : g(x−i) − ρ−1 ≤ xi ≤
g(x−i) + ρ−1}, and, as a result,  = O(ρ−1). This implies
that, for the policy in Theorem 3, we have
“privacy accuracy constant”.
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Fig. 4. The histogram of the reported weight and hight of individuals for various levels of accuracy, ρ. The darker colors show higher frequencies.
in centimetres. The hypothesis is given by
gH(x) =
⎧⎪⎨⎪⎩
p0,
x1
(x2/100)2
≥ 30,
p1,
x1
(x2/100)2
< 30.
Following the notation of Theorem 3, we can redefine the
hypothesis using the sign of x1 − g(x2) with g : x2 7→
30(x2/100)
2. Define
gY (x) =
⎧⎨⎩30(x2/100)2,
3x22
1000
− 1
ρ
≤ x1 ≤ 3x
2
2
1000
+
1
ρ
,
x1, otherwise.
(6)
Note that
µ
(JXK ∩ {x : g(x−i)− 1
ρ
≤ xi ≤ g(x−i) + 1
ρ
})
=
∫ 250
0
∫ min(3x22/1000+1/ρ,200)
max(3x22/1000−1/ρ,0)
dx1dx2
=
∫ 250
0
[max(3x22/1000− 1/ρ, 0)
−min(3x22/1000 + 1/ρ, 200)]dx2
Using this, we can compute the level of privacy guarantee.
The solid black line in Figure 3 illustrates privacy guarantee,
ϵ, versus accuracy level, ρ. The dashed line shows the
asymptotic O(ρ−1). As expected, by increasing accuracy, the
privacy guarantee can only be reduced and vice versa.
Now, we use a real dataset to investigate the effects of
the privacy-preserving policy in (6). We use a dataset of
preferences, interests, and demographics of young people,
aged between 15-30, of Slovakian nationality [40]. The data
was gathered in 2013 by students of an statistics class
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Fig. 5. The blue curve illustrates the difference of the mean value of the
weight of the population with and without the privacy preserving policy.
The red curve shows the difference between the empirical density functions
of the weight across the population with and without the privacy preserving
policy, measured by the Kullback–Leibler divergence.
at FSEV UK through friends and families. The dataset
consists of 1,010 records with 150 features (139 integer and
11 categorical) including height, weight, music preferences,
eating habits, etc. This dataset is popular for analysis on
Kaggle (an online platform for sharing data) with 99.4k
views and 21.8k downloads on all continents within the last
three years. Noting that the preferences of the individuals
can be matched with publicly available datasets, such as
IMDb (Internet Movie Database), to potentially identify the
individuals, there is a need for obfuscating the data in order
to avoid privacy breaches related to age, weight, and height.
Assume that we use the policy (6) is used for reporting
weight and height of individuals so that potential future
insurance agencies cannot test for the obesity levels. Figure 4
illustrates the histogram of the reported weight and hight
of individuals for various levels of accuracy, ρ. The darker
colors show higher frequencies. As expected, by decreasing
ρ, the accuracy gets worse; the histogram changes more
drastically. The blue curve in Figure 5 illustrates the dif-
ference of the mean value of the weight of the population
with and without the privacy preserving policy. The red
curve in Figure 5 shows the difference between the empirical
density functions of the weight across the population with
and without the privacy preserving policy. These curves
allows a data curator to balance between privacy and utility.
V. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORKS
We considered privacy against hypothesis testing adver-
saries using the theory of non-stochastic hypothesis test-
ing. We constructed reporting policies with prescribed pri-
vacy and utility guarantees. We demonstrated the utility of
privacy-preserving policies on a real dataset. Future work
can focus on development of optimal policies.
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